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Jackson Raps Arms Control

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The Nixon administration is being "dishonest in leading the American people to believe" that the missile defense around the Minuteman base at Grand Forks, N. D., adds to their security, Sen. Henry M. Jackson said yesterday.

Jackson's charge came as he cross-examined Gerard C. Smith, director of the U.S. arms control agency, on the agreement Smith negotiated with the Soviet Union to limit land and sea-based missiles.

"I'm appalled," said Jackson to newsmen after his morning-long questioning of Smith, "that he doesn't have the answers on the most important matters ever brought before the Senate as far as strategic arms are concerned."

Smith did give answers to most of the 25 written questions posed by Jackson on the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) agreement. But Jackson complained that the responses were incomplete and did not reveal the full extent of the understandings not put down on paper. "They have to explain what's involved in this," said Jackson of the Nixon administration.

The senator said he would not make his own decision whether to vote for the accord until after he had obtained fuller explanations. Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) of the Senate Armed Services Committee called Jackson's questions "excellent" during yesterday's meeting.

On the anti-ballistic-missile question specifically, Jackson told Smith that protecting the Grand Forks Minuteman base with only 100 interceptors—missiles which could take on incoming warheads—made little sense militarily. The 101st warhead, he argued, would come down on Grand Forks unimpeded, because the 100 defending missiles would have been used up.

Therefore, asked Jackson,

why spend any of the \$5.6 billion the administration wants for Grand Forks since there will not be enough missiles there to do any good? "Isn't there something wrong—I'll say dishonest—in leading the American people to believe" that putting 100 ABM interceptors around Grand Forks makes the U.S. offense look more credible in Soviet eyes and thus helps deter an attack?

Smith, in answering Jackson, said the 100 interceptors allowed under the SALT agreement "will protect a number of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) in that field" at Grand Forks.

"I'll tell you how bad it is, Ambassador Smith," said Jackson of the Grand Forks ABM defense. "It's now being called a research project—that's the latest bit of jargon being used."

If the administration wants \$5.6 billion for the Grand Forks ABM, said Jackson, it should install at least 500 interceptors—not just 100.

Jackson in years past has supported the Nixon administration's campaign for an extensive missile defense—one test originally called for protecting 12 Minuteman sites.

Under the SALT agreement, the United States and Soviet Union can each put a missile defense of 100 interceptors around one ICBM site and each nation's capital city, in Moscow that each side installing four ABM sites to protect its offensive missiles, arguing this would help stabilize the balance of terror.

Smith said that "we proposed" the 100 ABM missile limit and the Soviets accepted it. He added that 100 interceptors at Grand Forks was "about the level" proposed in the administration's ABM plan and that such a small deployment of defensive weapons would facilitate negotiation to limit offensive weapons.

Also, said Smith, the Soviets expressed concern that putting a U.S. missile defense at two or four ICBM sites "would be the kernel for regional, if not national, deployment" of an ABM system.

Other Jackson questions, and the responses:

• Why did the Soviets refuse to state in the arms control agreement itself that 1,618 missiles was the maximum number they would be allowed to deploy?

It was "not necessary to have a declaration," said Smith, because the United States "could detect readily" the deployment of one additional ICBM.

While Smith did not say so at the open hearing, the United States is counting on the Central Intelligence Agency's observation satellites flying over the Soviet Union to detect any new missiles put on the line.

"We'd see a new launcher under construction," said Smith. "I think Mr. Helms (director of the CIA) would testify to that."

• What percentage of the Soviet Union is covered by clouds 80 per cent of the time or more?

Smith said he did not know but would supply the information for the committee's secret session. Jackson replied, "This is something that has to be put in the public record at some point." He told newsmen

that verification techniques hinge on observation satellites; they cannot see through heavy clouds.

"The Soviets know it," Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said in supporting Jackson's demand for information on the cloud-cover problem. "I can't understand why it can't be made public."

"I think American people are entitled to know whether the treaty is wise or unwise," said Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.) in joining the cloud-cover discussion. "I for one am going to insist on that."

Cloud cover conditions figured in Air Force deliberations in the 1960s on whether to mobile ICBMs. One conclusion was that the national park lands in the west, where there is room for them, usually have crystal-clear weather. But critics said Soviet satellites could easily keep track of American ICBMs put on wheeled or tracked vehicles.

In contrast, heavy clouds over much of the Soviet Union make the mobile ICBM an attractive option there; according to some Pentagon analysts.

• Would the deployment of a land mobile ICBM by the Soviet Union constitute a violation of the interim SALT agreement limiting offensive missiles?

"Technically not," Smith told Jackson. "If we detected deployment of a mobile ICBM," he said, the United States would consider it "inconsistent with the purposes of the agreement," thus setting the stage for the U.S. to withdraw from it. He added that there "is no evidence" that the Soviets are "well advanced on mobile ICBMs."

• What evidence is there that the Soviets have accepted the "assured destruction" doctrine—the strategy of building enough retaliatory forces to deter another nation from striking first? And if the Soviet Union is building a second-strike force, why are they deploying the SS-9 ICBM of 25 megatons and its bigger follow-on—weapons which Jackson said threaten U.S. land-based missiles?

Smith said the "best evidence" is the Soviet acceptance of "very low levels" of anti-ballistic-missiles to defend their cities and ICBM sites. That, said Smith, "is one of the most important things about this agreement."

He added that the SS-9 was started long before the SALT treaty was negotiated. It is an over-simplification, he said, to focus on the size of the warheads since accuracy is an important factor in measuring destructive power.